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Todus: Fair Housing Act

NOTE

CITY OF EDMONDS v. OXFORD HOUSE,
INC.: OPENING DOORS TO HOUSING FOR
HANDICAPPED PERSONS

I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,l the United
States Supreme Court held that the Fair Housing Act's (hereinafter the "FHA") broad exemption for local maximum occupancy restrictions did not apply to the City's single family
zoning restrictions. 2 Although the City's ordinance did not
qualify for exemption from the FHA, the Supreme Court held
that the District Court would have to consider whether the
City discriminated against Oxford House residents. 3 Specifical1. _
u.s. _, 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995) (per Ginsburg, J., Thomas, J. dissenting). Oxford House opened a home for 10 to 12 unrelated recovering drug
addicts and alcoholics in a single-family residence. The City enforced its zoning
code which prohibits more than 5 unrelated persons from living together in a
single-family residence. Oxford House requested that the City make a reasonable
accommodation pursuant to the FHA. The City refused and sued Oxford House
seeking a declaratory judgment that the zoning ordinance qualified for exemption
from the FHA as a "local . . . restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." [d. at 1778-1779.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(l) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). Congress originally enacted the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion or national origin in housing. The FHA was later expanded to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex (1974), see Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1778 (citing
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 808(B), 88 Stat 729) and on
the basis of handicap and familial status (1988), see id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602
(h), (k». In fmding that the ordinance did not qualify for exemption from the
FHA, the Court held that a city cannot pass an ordinance which restricts maximum occupancy on any basis other than person per square foot or per bedroom.
[d. at 1782-83.
3. [d. at 1779, 1783.
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ly, the Court remanded to the District Court for further consideration of the claims by Oxford House that the City must make
a "reasonable accommodation."4
The Edmonds decision is important for two reasons. First
it will help handicapped persons attain greater access to housing. 5 Specifically, the decision marks the first time the Court
has struck down a local zoning ordinance because it failed to
qualify for the broad exemption from the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions for local ordinances. 6 Although it took seven
years for a case to reach the Court which allowed it to enforce
the legislative intent, the Edmonds decision provides a clear
message that the Court plans to follow the Congressional intene to pronounce a national commitment to prohibit exclusions of handicapped persons from the American mainstream
on the basis of stereotypes and ignorance. 8
Second, the Edmonds decision will significantly affect how
future zoning ordinances are drafted because the Court
approved density guidelines and not family composition rules. 9
For although handicapped persons may not fall within the
traditional concept of family, they nevertheless deserve a fami4. [d. at 1783.

5. See infra notes 182-185 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the effect on access to housing and curbing discrimination.
6. See Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 376 (1992) (Athens' ordinance, permitting a maximum of four unrelated
persons to live together in a single residence, qualified for exemption from the
FHA for "local maximum occupancy restrictions").
7. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-1782 (decided in 1995). Congress enacted the
FHA amendments prohibiting discrimination against handicapped persons and
defining discrimination to include "a refusal to make [a] reasonable accommodation" in 1988. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(h), 3604(O(3)(B) (Cumm. Supp. 1995).
8. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82 n.8. "The Fair Housing Act Amendments
Act . . . is a clear pronouncement to end the unnecessary exclusion of person with
handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereotypes and
ignorances, and mandates that persons with handicaps be considered as individuals." House Report at 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (1988) (hereinafter "House Report"). See infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative intent behind the FHA.
9. Here the author is using "density" to refer to restrictions based on the
number of people allowed by floor area or by space, like per square foot or per
bedroom for example. In contrast, "maximum occupancy" refers to maximum caps
placed on the total number of persons permitted per dwelling; an ordinance placing a maximum of five persons per house is an example. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at
1781-82 n.B.
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ly-like environment. Therefore, Edmonds will discourage strict
application of existing ordinances that adversely impact the
rights of handicapped persons. 10
Specifically, the Court's remand permits the District Court
to explore whether a "reasonable accommodation," as provided
for in the FHA, is appropriate since the parties did not litigate
the issue in the lower courts. 11 That decision may extend protection under the FHA to other Oxford House residents and
others similarly situated throughout the country. After the
District Court's decision on remand, groups similar to the Oxford House may reap the benefits of the Court's "reasonable
accommodations" interpretation. 12
This note will begin with an examination of the Edmond
Court's reasoning, and follow with a brief discussion of Oxford
House and the FHA. Next, the important role Oxford House
has played in challenging discriminatory housing practices will
be summarized. This note will then examine the Congressional
intent behind the FHA, concluding with a brief exploration of
the national impact this decision may have on handicapped
persons and local ordinances.
II. BACKGROUND
The rights of handicapped persons are protected through
various means. Two main protectors of those rights are Oxford
House, a private organization, and the FHA, legislation enacted by Congress.
A. OXFORD HOUSE: THE NATIONAL MODEL FOR DRUG AND
ALCOHOL ADDICT RECOVERY PROGRAMS
DISCRIMINATORY CITY ORDNANCES

CHALLENGES

Oxford House, a private organization, has been at the

10. See infra note 195 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
decision's effect on application of ordinances to handicapped persons.
11. Edmonds, 115 s. Ct. at 1783.
12. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the "reasonable accommodations" issue.
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forefront of the struggle to establish the housing rights of
handicapped persons. 13 Oxford House began challenging discriminatory city ordinances shortly after Congress extended
protection to handicapped persons in 1988. 14 In 1990, Oxford
House was involved in its first litigation, challenging a city
ordinance which they claimed violated the Fair Housing Act. 15
1. What is an "Oxford House?"

Oxford House is a not-for-profit organization serving as
the umbrella organization for a national network of approximately four hundred individual Oxford Houses. 16 Oxford
House Inc. was formed in 1975 in the Washington, D.C. area
by a former Capitol Hill lawyer and recovering alcoholic. 17
13. See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text providing examples of Oxford House challenging ordinances as violations of the FHA.
14. The first reported case was Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield,
769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991). The FHA was amended in 1988 to extend coverage to handicapped persons. See infra notes 52-82 and accompanying text for a
full discussion of the amendments.
15. Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J.
1991). On June 6, 1990, the City of Plainfield, New Jersey filed a "Complaint and
Order to Show Cause" in Superior Court. This marked the first time Oxford House
was sued after Congress enacted the 1988 amendments to the FHA. Id. at 1333.
A recent on-line search revealed eight cases reported in federal courts-see
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995); Oxford House Inc.
v. City of Albany, 155 F.R.D. 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Oxford House-C v. City of St.
Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D.Mo. 1994); Oxford House Inc. v. City of Virginia
Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D.Va 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,
819 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F.
Supp. 1168 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F.
Supp. 450, (D. N.J. 1992); U.S. v. Borough of Audubon, N.J., 797 F. Supp. 353
(D.N.J. 1991); and Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329
(D.N.J. 1991). Two state court cases have been reported-see Cherry Hill Tp. v.
Oxford House, Inc. 263 N.J. Super. 25 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1993) (this case is separate from the reported federal case in n.35 infra) and Colony Park Apartments v.
Public Service Com'n, 155 Mich. App. 134, (Mich. App. 1985).
See also Janan Hanna, Palatine Thwarted in Group-Home Case, November
10, 1993, CHI. TRIB. Nov. 10, 1993, at 1 (stating thirteen cases have been filed by
the Justice Department on behalf of Oxford House; general counsel for Oxford
House claiming Oxford House prevailed on all but two).
In these suits, Oxford House challenged city ordinances and/or the application of city ordinances. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S.
Ct. 1776 (1995).
16. Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 452. This number was cited in 1992 and a
later Oxford House case indicated that there are more than 450 Oxford Houses in
City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1563.
17. Paul Duggan, Group-Home Operator, District Settle Lawsuit; Program Ex-
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Oxford House establishes group homes for recovering alcoholics
and other substance abusers. 18
Oxford House establishes group homes in "clean, drug~free,
single family neighborhoods that will provide the occupants
with a sense of pride and self worth.,,19 It prefers to locate
homes in larger single family houses because they provide the
desired family atmosphere. 20 The location of the houses in
single~family residential neighborhoods has proven crucial to
"an individual's recovery by promoting self~esteem, creating an
incentive not to relapse and avoiding the temptations that the
presence of drug~trafficking can create."21 Access to public
transportation is important because most residents do not own
cars. 22 In addition, access to Alcoholics Anonymous and Nar~
cotics Anonymous meetings is important to residents in recov~
ery.23 Generally, eight to fifteen residents reside in Oxford
Homes. This range represents the number of residents which
make the homes economically and therapeutically viable. 24
Oxford Houses do not provide drug rehabilitation pro~
grams or treatment, health care, or social services. 25 Before
entering an Oxford House, persons must complete residential
drug treatment programs. 26 Each resident is required to work
and contribute to the democratic running of the house. 27 The
three requirements of an Oxford Home are: (1) democratic self~
government in which the residents make all decisions to run
the house; (2) economic self~sufficiency in that the residents
must support themselves without government assistance; and

empted from Zoning Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1995, at C3.
18. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 452.
19. Id. at 453.
20. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1564.
21. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 453 (emphasis added).
22. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1564.
23.Id.
24. Id. at 1571. However, in City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1255 n.1,
the court discussed that the main obstacle to that Oxford House was financial, but
treated the complaint in the light most favorable to Oxford House because the
City of Virginia Beach had filed a motion to dismiss. Therefore the court found
that the complaint alleged that therapeutic value suffered when the number of
residents was restricted to four. Id.
25. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 452.
26.Id.
27.Id.
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(3) zero drug tolerance. 28 A resident who uses drugs or alcohol, even once, is automatically expelled from the house. 29
2. Oxford House: Congressional Model for Drug and Alcohol
Abuse Programs
Congress formally recognized the Oxford House model in
1988 when President Reagan signed legislation to nationally
expand use of the Oxford House mode1. 30 Under this legislation, states receiving at least $100,000 from federal block grant
funds for alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and mental health services must make loans available to recovering alcoholics and
drugs addicts wishing to live in a group home based on the
Oxford House model. 31 In many states Oxford House maintains a contractual relationship with state health departments
to provide "revolving" loan funds. 32
B. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

While Oxford House has led the legal challenge to housing
discrimination, Congress has also been a key player in enacting anti-discrimination legislation for handicapped persons. 33
Initially, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act in 1968 to
prohibit discrimination in housing. 34 Twenty years later, Con28. 1d.
29. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 452. Accord City of St. Louis,

843 F. Supp. at 1562.
30. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1562 (citing Public Law No. 100-690,
102 State. 4181 (November 18, 1988».
31. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1561. In 1994 in Missouri, six residents
were required to qualify for a start-up loan for costs up to $4000. The interest-free
loans must be repaid within two years. 1d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25). In 1992 in
New Jersey, only four residents were required to qualify for loans. Township of
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 453.
32. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1562-63. "Revolving" loans are loans
given to help establish group homes for recovering addicts. A group of four or
more is entitled to up to $4000 for start-up costs such as a security deposit and
the first month's rent. The loan must be repaid within two years. To be eligible,
the group must operate under the Oxford House model. Township of Cherry Hill,
799 F. Supp. at 453.
33. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Congress' anti-discrimination legislation.
34. See House Report, supra note 7, at 15. In 1968, Congress determined that
racial discrimination limited access to housing for racial minorities. 1d. In re-
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gress amended the FHA to extend protection to handicapped
persons. 35 At that time, Congress also exempted local maximum occupancy restrictions from the FHA's anti-discrimination protection. 36
1. "Handicapped" Persons Receive Protection Under the
FHA37
The 1988 amendments to the FHA extended protection to
"handicapped" persons. 3S The amendments did not specifically
list covered disabilities. 39 Therefore, courts must look to the
legislative history behind the amendments to discern what
Congress meant by "handicapped." This legislative record
shows, first, that Congress sought to protect a broad class of
handicapped persons40 and, secondly, to proffer a public policy

sponse, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act as Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 to prohibit the invidious racial discrimination which prevailed
throughout the country. [d. Congress found that since discrimination in housing
affected interstate commerce, it had the power under the Commerce Clause to
enact prohibitive legislation. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1573 (discussing
Congressional power under the commerce clause to regulate interstate activities).
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited only racial discrimination in housing,
including the rental and sale of homes. Fair Housing Act § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988». According to the House report on the
1988 amendments, the Fair Housing Act was enacted in reaction to the urban
unrest of the mid 1960s and the assassination of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. House Report, supra note 7, at 15.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995).
37. The FHA states:
"Handicap means, with respect to a person - (1) a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) a
record of having such an impairment, or (3) being
regarded as having such an impairment, but such term
does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802»."
See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995), House Report, supra note 7, at
17-8.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). The amendments apply a broad
definition because of the difficulty in creating a comprehensive list and because
not all conditions existed or were common such that they should be protected. See
House Report, supra note 7, at 22 n.55.
40. House Report, supra note 7, at 18.
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against discrimination in housing that had the effect of excluding handicapped persons from everyday life. 41
Although Congress did not list specific disabilities under
its definition of "handicapped,"42 the House Report discloses
that Congress did intend the FHA protections to apply to persons with a record of drug use or addiction,43 except current
users of illegal drugs, as long as they otherwise qualified as
"handicapped" by their actual impairment or by the perception
of their impairment. 44 Specifically, Congress did not intend to
exclude persons who have recovered from an addiction or are
participating in a treatment program or self-help groUp.45 The
House Report also stated that as with other disabled persons
(cancer or tuberculosis patients), former drug-dependent persons do not pose a threat to a dwelling or its inhabitants simply on the basis of status. 46
Besides defining "handicapped," the legislative history
more importantly discloses the Congressional desire to curb
housing discrimination and extinguish public attitudes fueling
that discrimination. 47 Congress intended the 1988 Amend-

41. [d.
42. [d.

43. [d. at 22. This specific group of persons is mentioned because it is the
handicap the group of residents living in the Edmonds Oxford House shared.
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779.
44. House Report, supra note 7, at 22. Indeed, parties to FHA litigation usually agree that recovering drug addicts and alcoholics qualify for protection under
the FHA as "handicapped" persons. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. Cf Township of
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 459-460 (where the court required proof not only of
the residents' status as alcoholics or drug addicts, but also preliminary proof that
their addiction impacted a major life function) and Borough of Audubon, 797 F.
Supp. at 358 (where the City agreed that the residents were alcoholics and addicts, but challenged the fact that they were substantially limited in their major
life activities). An individual perceived as being a drug user is covered under the
Amendments if he can demonstrate that he is seen as having an impairment and
that he is not currently using illegal drugs. House Report, supra note 7, at 22.
45. [d. The Report stated that depriving those persons of housing "would constitute irrational discrimination that may seriously jeopardize their continued recovery." [d. Although the report does not refer to any specific instances or proof of
such a statement, the author believes the phrase "jeopardizing recovery" foreshadows case law in which the Courts of Appeal cite Oxford House assertions about
the therapeutic viability of its group homes. See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach, 825
F. Supp. at 1255 n.l and City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1564 n.2.
46. House Report, supra note 7, at 22.
47. [d. at 18.
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ments to clearly pronounce a national commitment to end
exclusion of handicapped persons from mainstream life.48 In
addition, the House Report shows that Congress condemned
"unfounded speculations" and "[g]eneralized perceptions about
disabilities.,,49 Although the House Report stated that discrimination against handicapped persons based on prejudice and
stereotyping were clearly prohibited, this strong anti-discrimination policy was absent from the text of the 1988 amendments. 50
The House Report also indicates Congress' belief that
prohibiting discrimination would alter the stereotypes that
have excluded handicapped persons from everyday life. 51 Furthermore, the Report demonstrates that Congress appreciated
that handicapped persons have been denied housing because of
misperceptions, ignorance, and outright prejudice. 52 Finally,
the House Report states that Congress intended the amendments to reach two situations in which handicapped persons
experienced discrimination, namely denying services to handicapped persons on the basis of status and excluding congregate
living arrangements of persons with handicaps.53

48. [d.
49. [d. The report mentioned several examples of handicapped persons who
had been discriminated against in housing and deplored such discrimination.
Wheelchair users, visually and hearing impaired persons, mentally retarded persons, and people with AIDS or who test positive for the AIDS virus were cited as
actual groups who had been discriminated against in housing because of prejudice
and aversion. [d.
50. House Report, supra note 7, at 18; see generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3607.
51. House Report, supra note 7, at 18.
52. [d. Specifically, handicapped persons have been denied housing "because
they make non-handicapped people uncomfortable." [d.
53. [d. at 23. It appears the Supreme Court uses the language from the House
Report to find the Edmonds ordinance does not qualify for exemption from the
FHA as a "reasonable local ordinance." However, the remainder of the report discussing this subsection seems to limit it to facilities and services other than basic
housing, like parking, cleaning services and other benefits made available to the
non-handicapped tenants, residents, and owners. [d. at 23-24.
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2. Local Maximum Occupancy Restrictions are Exempt from
FHA54
As well as extending the FHA to handicapped persons,
Congress has exempted reasonable local density ordinances
from the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHA. 55 Again,
the legislative history found in the House Report defines what
Congress intended to exempt from the FHA. 56 Although the
report indicates that Congress recognized that local governments have the authority to protect safety and health and to
regulate land use, this authority has sometimes been used to
restrict the rights of individuals with handicaps to live in certain communities. 57 Further, the House Report explains that
Congress intended this exemption to apply to limits placed on
"the number of occupants per unit based on a minimum number of square feet in the unit or the sleeping areas of the
unit.,,58 Such restrictions may of course continue provided
they apply to all occupants, and do not "discriminate on the
basis of ... handicap.,,59

Congress, however, clearly intended to prohibit from exemption local ordinances that amounted to "health, safety or
land-use requirements on congregate living arrangements" of
unrelated persons with disabilities. 60 Since these requirements are not placed on traditional families or other groups of
unrelated people, Congress recognized that these requirements
may discriminate against persons with disabilities. 61 Further,
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). "Nothing in this title limits
the applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." Id.
55.Id.
56. See House Report, supra note 7, at 23-24, 31.
57. House Report, supra note 7, at 24 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985». There, the Supreme Court overturned the
City's requirement that a group home for mentally retarded persons secure a special use permit. Id.
58. House Report, supra note 7, at 31.
59.Id.
60. Id. at 24. "This has been accomplished by such means as the enactment or
imposition of health, safety or land-use requirements on congregate living arrangements among non-related persons with disabilities. Since these requirements are
not imposed on families and groups of similar size of other unrelated people, these
requirements have the effect of discriminating against person with disabilities." Id.
61. Id.
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the House Report details Congress' intent to prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons in zoning decisions and
practices, land-use regulations, covenants, and permit procedures that effectively prevent handicapped individuals from
living in a selected residence in the community.62 Congress
stated that even the application of otherwise neutral rules
which had the effect of discriminating against handicapped
persons would amount to discrimination prohibited by the
FHA. 53
The House Report provides valuable insight into Congress'
intent behind the 1988 amendments that extended protection
to handicapped persons. 64 It states that exclusion of handicapped persons through invidious discrimination and procedural hurdles would not be tolerated. 65 In addition, Congress narrowly defined the new exemption from the FHA for local
mum occupancy restrictions. 66 Congress balanced local
government's interest in regulating land use with the desire to
prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons.

maxi-

C. OXFORD HOUSE CASES: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE
FHA AND OXFORD HOUSE

The FHA anti-discrimination protection covers handicapped persons, including former alcoholics and drug addicts. 67 Even so, Oxford House and other group home advocates· have faced major obstacles in protecting their clients

62. House Report, supra note 7, at 24.
63. Id. (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 435 (1985)). In Cleburne the city's
stated reasons were a 500 year flood plain, the location of the house across the
street from a school which would result in taunting of the house's residents, and
fear of lowered property values. Again the Court rejected all of these stated reasons as based on irrational fears. Id. "Such discrimination often results from false
or over-protective assumptions about the needs of handicapped people, as well as
unfounded fears of difficulties about the problems that their tenancies may pose."
House Report, supra note 7, at 24.
64. See supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
legislative intent behind the FHA.
65. House Report, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that, for example, special use
permits would not be tolerated).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995); House Report, supra note 7, at
23-24, 3l.
67. House Report, supra note 7, at 22.
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against housing discrimination. 68 Complex procedures and
invidious discrimination have decreased the effectiveness of
such programs and legislation. 69 In several cities, ordinances
have required group homes to apply for a variance or a conditional use permit. 70 In other cities, residents have faced invidious discrimination by city officials. 71
City ordinances often require a variance and/or a public
hearing in order to permit the group home to operate in a
single-family district. 72 In United States v. Borough of
Audubon,73 the City of Audubon required the property owners
of an Oxford House to either request a variance to use the
home as a boarding house or evict the Oxford House residents. 74 In Oxford House v. City of St. Louis, a group home of
nine or more could operate in a single-family district only if it
obtained a variance. 75 In Oxford House v. Township of Cherry
68. Witness all the suits filed by or on behalf of Oxford House since 1988, see
supra note 15 for a list of suits involving Oxford Houses since 1988 and see infra
notes 71-74, 107-108 discussing specific cases of invidious discrimination and special procedures.
69. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text for examples of zoning requirements placed on group homes.
70. See Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353.
71. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1566-67. The City Zoning Administrator
of the City of St. Louis testified "that he 'wouldn't want them living next door to
him.' His fears "included common, stereotypical fears such as safety, transiency,
and a negative effect on property values." Authors comment: while this discrimination would be less offensive and actionable if it came from a neighbor of the
house, it is much more offensive coming from a city official. ld.
72. ld. at 1568. The City of St. Louis requested Oxford House to apply for a
variance under the City's zoning ordinances. "Oxford House took the position that
it should not be required to participate in variance or conditional use applications." ld.
On the other hand, the Township of Cherry Hill required applicants who
did not meet the ordinance's definition of "family" to apply for a variance. The
variance involved public hearings, "at which the group members must present
testimony establishing they meet the vague standard of [the ordinance]." Township
of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 455.
73. 797 F. Supp. at 356.
74. [d. The house, a three-story, six-bedroom structure, was located in an area
zoned for single-family residences. Prior to its use as an Oxford House, Audubon
issued a resolution permitting the residence to be used as a duplex and this use
had never been objected to by neighbors or the City. ld. at 355. The property
owners did not request a variance and did not evict the residents. Audubon issued
weekly citations to the owners whose prosecution was stayed pending the outcome
of the federal court case. ld. at 356-57.
75. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568-69. However, a variance for a
group home of more than eight people was impossible to acquire. The zoning
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Hill,76 the township presented a similar requirement that the
property owners request a variance from the ordinance. 77 Unlike other city ordinances that numerically restrict unrelated
persons, Cherry Hill's ordinance imposed a "permanency and
stability" standard on groups of unrelated persons which was
not imposed on persons related by blood or marriage. 78 In order to obtain a variance, the residents had to testify at a public
hearing that they met this undefined standard. 79 The Township ruled that Oxford House could not operate in any of the
five residential zones. 80 Therefore, the Township effectively
prohibited Oxford House from operating a group home in any
single-family residential district and thereby discriminated
against the residents as handicapped persons. 81
Procedural requirements such as conditional or special use
permits imposed on group homes also discriminate against
handicapped persons. 82 In Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis,
the City required a conditional use permit for the Oxford
House to operate in a multi-family district. s3 And in Oxford

scheme provided that the City should not grant variances for "uses" that are not
allowed by right or conditionally. Since a group home was not allowed either conditionally or by right in a single family district, a variance would be impossible to
obtain. Clearly, the Oxford Houses, even though they never applied for a variance,
would have been denied a variance by the City. 1d. at 1568-70.
76. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 455.
77. 1d.
78. 1d. In addition, the "standard is never imposed on groups related by blood
or marriage because they are automatically found to meet the definition of 'family'
regardless of their particular circumstances." 1d. In n.7 the court made specific
findings in which the Director of Community Development admitted he could not
think of a single incident in which a group of related people were denied a certificate on the basis of their failure to meet the definition of family or the "permanency or stability" standard. 1d.
79. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 455.
80. 1d. at 456.
8l. See id.
82. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text for examples of discriminatory procedural requirements.
83. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568. The City ordinance permitted a
group home of nine or more residents as a matter of right only in the central
business district and a memorial district. 1d. The court found the ordinance did
not qualify as an exemption from the FHA because "it simply restricts the maximum number of certain types of occupants." 1d. at 1574. The court noted the decision in Elliott, 960 F.2d 975, but found its reasoning unpersuasive. City of St.
Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1574. The court found the City violated the FHA, granted
the permanent injunction, and awarded attorneys' fees. 1d. at 1584.
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House v. City of Virginia Beach, a city ordinance required Oxford House to apply for a conditional use permit for a group
home of more than four unrelated individuals in a single-family district.B4 Although Oxford House argued in City of St. Louis and City of Virginia Beach that requiring a conditional use
permit and the resulting public hearing violated the FHA (because other groups of unrelated persons were not subjected to
this procedure), the courts required Oxford House to follow the
application procedure and subject the residents to a public
hearing. 85 In several cases in which residents faced invidious
discrimination by city officials,86 this discrimination was
found to violate the FHA.87 In Oxford House-C v. City of St.
Louis, the court expressed that it was not surprised to find
discrimination by officials "given ... that none of the City
housing inspectors or building or zoning officials . . . have ever
received any training regarding discrimination in housing practices."88 The zoning administrator testified that he "wouldn't
want them living next door to him.,,89
The background behind the recent Edmonds decision involves understanding the Oxford House model and the Congressional intent behind the FHA.90 First, Congress extended

84. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1254. The City's ordinance defined
"family" to include groups of no more than four people unrelated by blood or marriage. [d. (citing VA. BEACH CODE ZONING ORDINANCE § 111).
85. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568-70; City of Virginia Beach, 825 F.
Supp. at 1260. In City of Virginia Beach, Oxford House claimed that its residents
would be exposed to "unwanted public scrutiny in the course of the required zoning hearings." In fact, the court held that because Oxford House had not applied
for and been denied a conditional use permit, its claim of discrimination was "unripe." [d.
86. See Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp 353, discussed supra at notes 73-74
and City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, discussed supra at notes 71-72 and
accompanying text for further discussion of discrimination by officials.
87. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. at 362-363. There the court found that
the Mayor's statement that "there is nothing more that I would like to do than to
just come in and just tell these people you have until noon to get out of town"
and his recommendation "to the municipal prosecutor that he should seek the
most severe monetary penalty to establish an effective deterrent to this ongoing
activity" amounted to discriminatory animus. [d. at 360. In Audubon the court
awarded a permanent if\junction to prevent future interference with the Oxford
House or other group living arrangements and $10,000.00 in civil penalties. [d. at
362.
88. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568 n.8.
89. [d. at 1567.
90. The author notes that the Oxford House cases discussed supra in notes 67-
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the FHA's anti-discrimination protection to handicapped persons in 1988.91 Second, Congress exempted local maximum
occupancy restrictions.92 Therefore, the legislative history
shows that Congress intended this provision to exempt only
local restrictions that applied to all occupants. 93 Nonetheless,
many city ordinances limited occupancy of unrelated persons
without restricting related persons. 94 These ordinances have
the effect of discriminating against handicapped persons. 95 In
addition, city officials continue to discriminate against handicapped persons in their application of the ordinances. 96 Even
in the face of this continued discrimination, several years
passed before Oxford House's litigation reached the Supreme
COurt. 97
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the summer of 1990, Oxford House Inc. (hereinafter
"Oxford House") opened a group home for ten to twelve recovering drug and alcohol addicts in the City of Edmonds, Washington (hereinafter "the City").98 Although the residents were
unrelated, the home opened in a neighborhood zoned for single
family residences. 99 Subsequently, the City issued criminal
citations, charging that Oxford House1°O had violated the
City's zoning code because the group home housed more than
89 and accompanying text serve to illustrate actual discrimination handicapped
persons faced in waging the battle against discriminatory ordinances and practices.
91. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Congress' extension of protection to handicapped persons.
92. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Congress's extension of the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions.
93. See supra note 60 and accompanying text illustrating Congress' goal of
uniform application of the exemption for local density ordinances.
94. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text providing examples of city
ordinances and discriminatory application of city ordinances.
95. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text for examples of ordinances
that in their application discriminate against handicapped persons.
96. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text for examples of ordinances
that in their application discriminate against handicapped persons.
97. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for explanation of the time between Congress enacting the 1988 amendments and the Edrrwnds decision.
98. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 1776,
1779 (1995).
99. [d.
100. [d. The City issued criminal citations to a resident and the owner of the
house. The owner of the house was later removed as a party. [d.
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five unrelated individuals. 101 In response, Oxford House asserted that the group home needed to have eight to twelve
residents to be financially and therapeutically viable. 102 Although the City refused to allow the group home to remain in
a single-family residential area, the City passed an ordinance
permitting group homes in multifamily and general commercial zones. 103
The City then sued Oxford House in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington for a
declaratory judgment.104 The City sought a declaration that
the zoning ordinance qualified for exemption from the FHA as
"reasonable local, State or Federal restrictions regarding the
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling."105
Oxford House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging
that the City failed to make a "reasonable accommodation"
when it prevented the group home from remaining in a singlefamily residential zone. 106 Oxford House asserted that the
City ordinance discriminated against handicapped persons in a
manner prohibited by the Fair Housing Act Amendments of
1988. 107 Oxford House claimed that under the Act, a refusal

101. [d. (citing Edmonds Community Development Code (ECDC) § 21.30.010).
The City's zoning code requires that the occupants of a single-family dwelling unit
must comprise a "family." The code defined "family" as "an individual or two or
more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or
fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage." Edmonds,
115 S. Ct. at 1779. The City suspended prosecution for the criminal citations until
resolution of the subsequent litigation. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d.
104. [d.
105. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1778-79 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm.
Supp. 1995».
106. [d. at 1779.
107. [d. Congress originally enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin in housing.
The FHA was later expanded to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex (1974),
see id. at 1778 (citing Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 808(B),
88 Stat 729), and the basis of handicap and familial status (1988), see id. (citing
42 U.S.C. §§ 3602 (h), (k». The parties stipulated for this litigation that the residents of the group home were within the Act's definition of handicapped persons.
[d. at 1779. Under the Act, "handicap means, with respect to a person 1) a physicalor mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
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to make a "reasonable accommodation" qualified as prohibited
discrimination. lOS The United States filed a separate suit
raising the same claim as Oxford House, and the two cases
were consolidated. 109
The District Court granted the City's summary judgment
motion, finding that the ordinance qualified under the FHA's
broad exemption for local ordinances that address maximum
occupancy standards. no The District Court held that: (1) the
exemption applied to the five unrelated person limitation in
the ordinance; and (2) permitting the exemption was reasonable as a matter oflaw. 111
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the FHA's
"absolute exemption inapplicable."u2 The Ninth Circuit remanded for further consideration of the claims raised by Oxford House and the United States. 113
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits were in conflict.114 Mer consideration,

major life activities, 2) a record of having such an impairment, or 3) being regarded as having such an impairment, but such terms do not include current, illegal
use of or addiction to a controlled substance." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp.
1995).
108. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. Section 3604(f)(3)(B) states "For purposes of
this subsection, discrimination includes . . . (B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations
may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (Cumm. Supp. 1995).
109. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779.
110. Id. The District Court held that the City's ordinance "defining 'family' is
exempt . . . as a 'reasonable . . . restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.'" Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The Ninth Circuit focused on the legislative intent behind the FHA
protections for handicapped persons. Specifically, the court noted "Congress intended the FHAA [the 1988 amendments] to protect the right of handicapped persons
to live in the residence of their choice in the community. [citation ommitted] The
FHAA was to 'end the unnecessary exclusion of person with handicaps from the
American mainstream.'" City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council 18
F.3d 802, at 806 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. Specifically, Oxford House claimed the City
refusal's to make "a reasonable accommodation" constituted a violation of the FHA.
Id.
114. Id. at 1780; Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992). In
Elliott the city ordinance restricted to four the number of unrelated persons who
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the Supreme Court held that the City's ordinance did not qualify for exemption from the FHA.115 However, the Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to consider Oxford House's counterclaim that the City had wrongfully discriminated under the
FHA by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation. 116
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S MAJORITY OPINION l17

Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion began by differentiating land use restrictions 118 from maximum occupancy restrictions. 119 According to Justice Ginsburg, land use restrictions
are enacted to locate sites having compatible uses close together within districts,120 and maximum occupancy restrictions
are enacted to protect public health and safety by limiting
overcrowding. 121 Since the FHA exempts local restrictions regarding maximum occupancy of a dwelling, the majority noted
that a city's zoning ordinance mayor may not qualify for exemption. 122 The Court closely examined the legislative history
of the FHA 1988 Amendments which created the exemption for
local maximum occupancy restrictions. 123 The Court found
that Congress intended to protect maximum occupancy restrictions not tied to family composition rules and not devised to
protect the character of a neighborhood by focusing on household composition. 124
could live together in a single family residential unit. [d.
115. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783.
116. [d.
117. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Breyer joined in the majority opinion. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., _
U.S. _ , 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1778 (1995).
118. [d. at 1780. "Land use restrictions designate 'districts in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.' [citation] These restrictions typically categorize uses as single-family residential, multiple-family residential, commercial, or industrial." [d. at 1781.
119. [d. at 1781. "Maximum occupancy restrictions ... cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically in relation to available floor space or the number and
type of rooms. [citation] These restrictions ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling units. [d. (emphasis in original).
120. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780-81.
121. [d. at 1782.
122. 42 U.S.C. 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780.
123. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82.
124. [d. See especially id. at 1782 n.8.
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In its analysis, the Court first noted that Congress cast
section 3607(b)(1)125 of the FHA within the already evolving
distinction between land use restrictions and maximum occupancy restrictions. 126 Land use restrictions typically divide a
city into districts in which compatible uses of land are permitted and incompatible uses of land are prohibited. 127 The
Court recognized that cities have further restricted land use
within residential districts to single-family and multiple-family
use. The Court found that when drawing these further restrictions, a city must necessarily define the term "family.,,128 By
reserving land for single-family residences, the Court noted
that cities seek to secure "zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people.»129
On the other hand, the Court reasoned that maximum
occupancy restrictions seek to limit the number of occupants
per dwelling in relation to the available floor space and the
number and type of rooms. 130 The Court stressed that these
restrictions typically apply to "all residents of all dwellings" in
the designated area. 131 Finally, the Court recognized that
maximum occupancy restrictions are enacted to protect health
and safety by preventing overcrowding. 132
Mter clarifying the distinction between land use restrictions and maximum occupancy restrictions, the majority

125. The provision which exempts reasonable local restrictions from the FHA.
126. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780.
127. [d. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the
fIrst case in which the Court upheld land use restrictions as constitutional. Although the land use restrictions were challenged as "takings" under the 5th
Amendment, the case still stands for the proposition that a city may restrict land
use by district which is known as "Euclidean zoning." [d. The Court noted that
generally a city will separate competing land uses to prevent problems often characterized as the "pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Edmonds, 115 S. Ct.
at 1781 (citing Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. at 388).
128. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781 As the Court said in Edmonds, "[t]o limit
land use to single-family residences, a municipality must define the term 'family,'
thus family composition rules are an essential component of single-family residential use restrictions." [d.
129. [d. (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
130. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 178l.
131. [d. (emphasis in original).
132. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 9

756

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:737

turned to the language of the exemption provision. 133 The
Court found that the language encompassed maximum occupancy restrictions but did not cover family composition rules
that are typically tied to land use restrictions. l34 The majority
reasoned that rules that "plainly and unmistakably" cap the
total number of occupants in order to prevent overcrowding
qualify under the FHA's broad exemption. However, the Court
stated that rules focusing on household composition rather
than on total number of occupants are not exempt from the
FHA. 136
The Court reasoned that the provisions of the City's ordinance at issue were classic examples of a use restriction coupled with a family composition rule. The main provision invoked against Oxford House limited use to single-family residences. 136 Furthermore, a second provision in the ordinance
limited the number of occupants to a dwelling based on floor
area. 137 The City argued that the third provision, the family
composition rule, qualified for the FHA exemption as a maximum occupancy restriction because it limited the number of
unrelated persons who may live in a single-family dwelling to
five. 13s The majority rejected the City's argument because the
family composition rule did not answer the question "[w]hat is
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
house?,,139

133. [d. "[R]estrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted
to occupy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(l) (Cumm. Supp. 1995).
134. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82. "In sum, rules that cap the total number
of occupants in order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling 'plainly and unmistakably,' [citation omitted] fall within § 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption from the
FHA's governance; rules designed to preserve the family character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number
of occupants living quarters can contain, do not." [d. at 1782.
135. [d.
136. [d. (citing ECOC § 16.20.010 which provides that the sole "Permitted Primary Us[e]" in a single-family residential zone is "[s]ingle-family dwelling units.")
[d.
137. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782 (citing ECOC § 19.10.000, adopting the Uniform Housing Code § 503(b) (1988)). Here the provision provided that each unit
have one room with a minimum of 120 square feet floor area. Other rooms must
have a minimum of 70 square feet. In addition where two or more people occupy
a room, the floor area shall be increased at the rate of 50 square feet for each
occupant in excess of two. [d.
138. [d. (citing ECOC § 21.30.010) (emphasis added).
139. [d.
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In conclusion, the Court held that the ordinance was not
exempt under the FHA because it restricted the total number
of unrelated occupants without also restricting the number of
related occupants to occupy a house. l40 However, the Court
held only that the City's provision did not qualify for the FHA
exemption, merely affirming the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the
case. 141 On remand, the Court instructed the District Court to
determine whether the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions,
requiring a "reasonable accommodation," applied and what the
City should have done to "accommodate" the Oxford House
under the FHA.142
B. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Thomas' dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, contained two main points. l43 First, Thomas analyzed the "plain language" of the FHA exemption provision to
find that the ordinance qualified for exemption. l44 Second,
Thomas criticized the majority for reading the statute too. narrowly.l45
Using "plain language," Thomas focused on the exemption
provision's use of the words "any," "restrict," and "regard. "146
The exemption does not contain qualifying language requiring
"absolute" or "unqualified" maximum occupancy restrictions as
found by the maj ority. 147 Thomas emphasized Congress'
choice of broad terms in signalling exempt categories and restrictions. l48 From this, Thomas reasoned that the ordinance
was eligible for exemption because it was a "restriction" addressing occupancy density.149

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

[d. at 1782·83.
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783.
[d.
[d. at 1783·88.
[d. at 1783·85.
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1785·88.
[d. at 1783·85.
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1784.

148. [d.
149. [d. "[Tlhe rule that 'no house... shall have more than five
occupants' ... readily qualifies as a 'restrictio[nl regarding the maximum number
of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.' " [d.
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Thomas further used his "plain language" approach to
criticize the majority for framing the issue around the number
of occupants permitted to occupy a house. 15o Thomas felt that
the ordinance need not establish an absolute maximum number of occupants because the exemption applied to restrictions
"regarding" maximum occupancy. 151 By analyzing the language/52 Justice Thomas found that the ordinance qualified
for exemption from the FHA.153
Secondly, Thomas argued that the majority read the statute too narrowlyl54 and negated the FHA's broad policy. 155
Thomas reasoned that Congress sought to effectuate the policy
of fair housing by the language it used in the statute. 156 Narrowly reading that language, he argued, frustrated the purpose
of the statute. 157 In addition, Thomas asserted that land use
regulation was an area left to the states to the exclusion of
Congress. l58 Therefore, under the United States' federalist
structure of government, if Congress regulates that area, its
intention to preempt the states should be clearly stated. 159
150. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1784 (criticizing the majority for posing the wrong
question in relation to the statute, citing the majority opinion at 1782).
151. [d. "To take advantage of the exemption, a local, state, or federal law need
not impose a restriction establishing an absolute maximum number of occupants;
under § 3607(b)(1), it is necessary only that such law impose a restriction "regarding" the maximum number of occupants." [d. (emphasis in original, citing the
majority opinion at 1782). (Emphasis added to text.)
152. Thomas mentioned synonyms of "regard," specifically "concern," "relate to,"
or "bear on" to make his point that to be exempted, the ordinance did not have to
establish an absolute maximum number of occupants. [d.
153. [d. at 1785. Thomas stated the Ninth Circuit's decision should be reversed.
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1785.
154. [d.
155. [d. The stated policy is "to provide for fair housing throughout the United
States." [d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601).
156. [d.
157. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1785 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S.
522 (1987)).
158. [d. at 1786. Thomas argued that the majority's opinion ignored precedent
where the Court held the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to
state judges because Congress had not intended it be applied to state employees.
[d. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) where the Court held that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not protect state court judges although
the Act "broadly prohibits" age discrimination). Thomas' reasoning rested on the
federalist structure of our government which requires Congress to clearly indicate
it is preempting state power in areas that are traditionally left to the states to
regulate. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct at 1785-86.
159. [d. The court in Edmonds stated:
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While reading the statute narrowly may be appropriate in
other areas, construing the exemption narrowly in the area of
land use was unreasonable. 160
As part of his criticism of the majority's narrow reading,
Thomas discussed the majority's use of the two terms, "maximum occupancy restrictions" and "family composition
rules.,,161 Thomas dismissed the categories as fictions. 162 He
found that "maximum occupancy restrictions" failed to encompass all the types of restrictions exempted from the FHA.163
As an example, he argued that the plain language of the statute does not mention available floor space or the number and
type of rooms. l64 Thomas reasoned that the language of the
statute does not require the restrictions to apply to all residents of all dwelling unitS. 165 In addition, the statute does
not require restrictions to protect health and safety by preventing overcrowding. 166 Although Thomas conceded that the statutory language encompasses "maximum occupancy restrictions," the statutory language does not necessarily exclude the
City's ordinance as claimed by the majority.167 Thomas found
that the majority's distinction between pure maximum occupancy and land use restrictions was irrelevant to the issue
presented by the City's ordinance. 16s

[T]he power of Congress to 'legislate in areas traditionally
regulated by the States' is 'an extraordinary power in a
federalist system,' and 'a power that we must assume
Congress does not exercise lightly.' [citation omitted]
Thus, we require that 'Congress should make its intention
'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the . . .
States.'
Id. at 1786 (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
160. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1786. Thomas focused on the concept of federalism
which is at the core of our government. Id.
16l. Id. at 1786-88.
162. Id. at 1786 ("zoning rules simply invented by the majority.")
163. Id. at 1787 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1)).
164. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1787.
165. Id. (emphasis in original).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. "In other words, although the majority's discussion will no doubt provide guidance in future cases, it is completely irrelevant to the question presented
in this case." Edmonds, 115. S. Ct. at 1787.
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In a similar argument, Justice Thomas criticized the
majority's use of "family composition rules" as an invented
category of zoning restrictions. 169 Thomas found that the majority opinion "hinged" on its classification of the City's ordinance as a "family composition rule." This criticism rested on
the fact that the majority opinion said "virtually nothing about
this crucial category."170 Concluding, Thomas returned to the
"plain language" of the statute to support his position that the
FHA's exemption for local restrictions encompasses "any" zoning restriction as long as it "regards the maximum number of
occupants.,,17l Thomas noted that the statute does not contain
qualifying language as to the purpose of the exemption. 172
Again, Thomas found that the language of the exemption does
not require "absolute" maximum occupancy restrictions. 173
These two grounds supported the dissent's finding that the
majority misinterpreted the language of the statute. 174
V. CRITIQUE
The Edmonds decision is important for several reasons. 175 First, the decision takes a step towards curbing invidious discrimination and helping handicapped persons to attain
greater access to housing. 176 Second, the decision is important
because it will affect how future state and local zoning ordinances are written,177 discouraging strict application of current ordinances that would adversely impact the rights of
handicapped persons. 178
169. [d.

170. [d. at 1782 (citing the majority opinion at 1782).
171. [d. at 1788.
172. [d. "Section 3607(b)(1) [the exemption provision] limits neither the permissible purposes of a qualifying zoning restriction nor the ways in which such a
restriction may accomplish its purposes." Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1788.
173. See supra notes 146-158 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the plain language approach.
174. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1788.
U.S. _ , 115 S. Ct. 1776
175. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., _
(1995); see infra notes 177-196 and accompanying test for further discussion of the
impact of the decision.
176. See infra notes 181-188 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the impact on access to housing.
177. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 n.3 (setting forth the State of Washington's
1993 law prohibiting local city ordinances that discriminate between handicapped
persons and other persons, which was enacted after this litigation began).
178. See Paul Duggan, Group-Home Operator, District Settle Lawsuit; Program
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The Edmonds decision, however, does not discuss two
important issues. First, the Court did not address the "reasonable accommodations" counter-claim raised by Oxford
House. 179 Second, the Court neglected to indicate the extent
.of the impact that the majority's "narrow reading" approach
would have on future FHA litigation. ISO
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EDMONDS DECISION

First, the Edmonds decision is important because it significantly helps handicapped persons to attain greater access to
housing. Oxford House residents benefit because cities will no
longer be able to regulate group living situations by defining
what constitutes a "family" or by limiting occupancy in another
prohibited way. lSI Thus, Oxford House residents will have
greater access to housing because occupancy limits, in the form
of now-illegal ordinances, will be removed. ls2 Similarly, other
persons recognized as "handicapped" under the FHA definition
will also achieve greater access to housing. ls3

Exempted from Zoning Rules, WASH. POST, September 7, 1995, at C3 (lawsuit on
behalf of Oxford Houses challenging the District of Columbia's characterization of
the group homes as "rooming houses," yet allowing the homes to operate during
the pending litigation; settlement negotiations began shortly after the Court's decision in Edmonds).
179. Edmonds 115 S. Ct. at 1783. The Court did not address the "reasonable
accommodations" claim because the parties did not litigate it in the lower court.
Id. (stating the Court only addressed the threshold question of whether the City's
ordinance qualified for exemption and that the lower court must now decide
whether the City's actions constituted a "failure to make reasonable accommodations" as provided in the anti-discrimination provision of the FHA).
180. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 (the majority found this case was an instance
where the exception to a general policy is read narrowly to preserve the primary
operation of the policy). Author's note: See the case generally because the majority
never indicated when the "narrow reading" approach would be used in the future.
Id.
181. Id.
182. James G. Sotos, In Narrow Ruling, Court Rejects Limit on Group Home,
CHICAGO DAlLY L. BULL., May 18, 1995, at 6 (summarizing the Edmonds decision
as concluding the city could not rely on its zoning restriction to regulate the Oxford House).
183. United States v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 872 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (holding the City violated the FHA when it characterized a home for elderly
handicapped persons as "multiple family," it discriminated against the residents);
Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992) (after
Edmonds, the City in Elliott would likely be unable to successfully argue their
ordinance was exempt; therefore the residents of the home, which was not mod-

c.r.
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In addition to expanding access to housing for handicapped
persons, the Edmonds decision will curb invidious discrimination. l84 In the past, this discrimination has surfaced as stereotypical attitudes based on fear and ignorance, manifesting
as concern over lowered property values lS5 and unequal application of zoning laws. ls6 However, the majority's utilization of
legislative history/s7 including a thorough discussion of the
specific discrimination Congress sought to prohibit, suggests
that invidious discrimination will now be less tolerated. 188
Second, the Edmonds decision is important because it will
affect how future state and local ordinances are written. 189 In
Edmonds, the Court found that ordinances should be written
to impose restrictions based on density/90 such as personsper-bedroom or persons-per-square-foot and should not be
based on family-compositioin rules. 191 Therefore, an
eled as an Oxford House group home, would now be protected).
184. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for examples of invidious
discrimination. See also Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782 (stating that rules that fasten on family composition instead of total number of occupants do not qualify for
exemption from the FHA).
185. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. See also City of Taylor, 872
F. Supp. at 433 (criticizing the City's strict application of its zoning ordinance to a
home for elderly handicapped persons on the basis that the "for-profit" home did
not fall under the definition of "family;" the City discriminated against the home
because it is the only one the "for-profit" status has been used against); and
Adriana Colindres, City Desk News, PEORIA J. STAR, September 11, 1993, at A6
(discussing a proposed change to the City of East Peoria's zoning code that would
require group homes for people with disabilities be built at least 660 to 1500 feet
apart).
187. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82 nn.8-9, (citing House Report, supra note 7,
at 31).
188. House Report, supra note 7, at 24 (examples of this discrimination include
imposing local ordinances on congregate living arrangements of unrelated persons
with disabilities or enforcing otherwise neutral rules in a way that discriminates
against handicapped persons).
189. See supra note 177 and accompanying text addressing the impact on construction of future ordinances. See Jim Gogek, A Bad Way to Tackle our Social·
Problems, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., November 24, 1995, at B7 (criticizing the
City Council's decision to discriminate against the mentally ill and recovering drug
addicts by the Council retaining power to keep group homes out of neighborhoods
that do not want them, in direct violation of the FHA).
190. House Report, supra note 7, at 31 (stating reasonable limits on the number
of occupants based on a minimum number of square feet in the unit would be
allowed to continue as long as they were applied equally).
191. See also Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782 n.B (quoting the House Report, supra
note 7, approving limits based on a minimum number of square feet in the unit
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ordinance will no longer be neutral if it discriminates against
handicapped persons living in group homes. 192 Furthermore,
Edmonds aids handicapped persons because it discourages
strict application of current ordinances,193 by finding that the
exemption provision was intended to allow for restrictions that
apply to all occupants and limit occupancy on the basis of person per square foot. 194
B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Although handicapped persons will benefit in terms of
greater access and curtailed discrimination, the opinion failed
to adequately analyze Oxford House's "reasonable accommodations" claim raised by Oxford House. 195 The "reasonable accommodations" claim was not reached because the parties only
presented the threshold "exemption" question and did not litigate the "reasonable accommodations" claim in the lower
court. 196
The FHA provides that discrimination includes "a refusal
to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary

or the sleeping areas of the unit). See supra note 9 and accompanying text for
further definition of density restrictions.
192. The author fears, however, that the density limits could be placed so low
as to have the effect of discriminating against group homes that may have higher
density living arrangements in terms of persons-per-bedroom.
193. See Paul Duggan, Group-Home Operator, District Settle Lawsuit; Program
Exempted from Zoning Rules, WASH. POST, September 7, 1995, at C3 (lawsuit on
behalf of Oxford Houses challenging the District of Columbia's characterization of
the group homes as "rooming houses," yet allowing the homes to operate during
the pending litigation; settlement negotiations began shortly after the Court's decision in Edmonds).
194. Edmonds 115 S. Ct. at 1782 (rules that fasten on the composition of
households rather than the total number of occupants a residence can contain do
not qualify for exemption from the FHA).
195. [d. at 1783 (stating the decision only addressed the threshold question of
whether the ordinance was exempt from the FHA; on remand, the lower court
must decide whether the City's actions violated the FHA prohibitions against discrimination).
196. [d. See also City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bld'g Code Council, 18 F.3d
802, 803-04, (9th Cir. 1994) (the 9th Circuit's decision in Edmonds) (stating that
after granting the City's summary judgment motion, compliance with the substantive requirements of the FHA is not at issue because the district court did not
reach that question).
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to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling."197 Because a court's interpretation of "reasonable
accommodations" necessarily involves a fact-intensive survey /98 the Supreme Court remanded to the lower courts for
consideration of whether an accommodation would be appropriate. 199
In addition to leaving the "reasonable accommodations"
issue unresolved, the majority did not indicate just how far
their "narrow reading" of FHA exemptions would extend. 2°O
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg's word choice creates ambiguity
as to whether the Court will utilize the approach in the future. 201 Ginsburg stated that "this case [was] an instance"
where an exemption to the FHA's general anti-discrimination
policy "is sensibly read 'narrowly'" to promote the goals of the
FHA. 202
This language suggests two meanings with very different
impacts on potential FHA litigation. On the one hand, the
Court could be holding that the factual scenario implicated by
this Oxford House presents an isolated instance worthy of
reading an exemption from the FHA narrowly.2oa On the other hand, the Court could be announcing a new general standard, mandating in all instances a narrow reading of exemptions to the general anti-discrimination policy of the FHA.204
Ginsburg's use of the words "instance" and "sensibly" make it
unclear whether the Court will use this "narrow reading" approach in the next case challenging a discriminatory ordinance
or practice. Therefore, the impact of the Edmonds decision on

197. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(3)(B) (Cumm. Supp. 1995).
198. City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bld'g Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 807 (9th
Cir. 1994) (the 9th Circuit's decision in Edmonds). "Many factors must be weighed
to determine whether reasonable accommodation under [the FHA] was achieved."
[d.
199. Edmonds at 1783, affirming the Ninth Circuit's remand "for further consideration of the claims asserted by Oxford House and the United States." [d.
200. [d. at 1780, 1782.
201. See infra notes 202-204 and accompanying text for discussion of Justice
Ginsburg's choice of language and the impact of the decision on future litigation.
202. [d. at 1780.
203. [d. at 1780.
204. [d.
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future FHA litigation remains unknown in the absence of a
clear message from the Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court held that the City's ordinance did not
qualify for the Fair Housing Act's exemption for local maximum occupancy restrictions. 205 The Edmonds decision marks
the first time that the Court has invalidated an ordinance
because it did not meet the requirements for the exemption
provision. 206 Consequently, the Edmonds decision marks an
important turning point for handicapped persons in achieving
greater access to housing. However, because the Court did not
address the "reasonable accommodations" claim raised by Oxford House, the impact of Edmonds upon future FHA litigation
ultimately remains unclear since the majority failed to clearly
announce whether its "narrow reading" approach would apply
in subsequent cases.
Michelle R.K. Todus207

205. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House Inc., _
U.S. _ , 115 S. Ct. 1776,
1783 (1995).
206. [d. at 1780-83.
207. Golden Gate University, School of Law, Class of 1997. Thank you Mark,
Wendy, Rob and Professor Andersson for your time and patience with me while I
was writing this article.
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